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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOHN E. MERRIHEW,

)
)

Plaintiff- Appellant, )
)

-vs-

)
)

SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING AND
)
ZONING COMMISSION, LELAND S.
)
SWANER, BUDD M. RICH, GARY D.
)
PALMER, DALE V. JONES, THOMAS
)
BOWEN, VELMA STEELE, WILLI.AM
)
MARSH, CLAYNE RICKS & RAY NOBLE,)

Case No. 18070

)

Defendants-Respondents. )
)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks the issuance of an extraordinary Writ in the nature of mandamus under Rule 65B(b), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, to require the defendants-respondents
to reinstate and implement the decision of the Board of County
Commissioners of Salt Lake County approving his Application for
a zoning change.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor
of defendants-respondents after ruling that the case presented no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that defendants-respondents
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff - appellant seeks on this appeal to have the
Summary Judgment vacated and set aside and to have the case
remanded to the District Court for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the District Court of
Salt Lake County seeking the issuance of an Extraordinary Writ
in the nature of Mandamus under the provisions of Rule 65B(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Those named as defendants included

all serving members of the Salt Lake County Planning Commission and
the Zoning Administrator, Planning Director and Building Inspection

Department Director of Salt Lake County. (R.20-29)
The Complaint alleges that plaintiff filed his Application
with the Salt Lake County Planning Commission for a zoning change
on a small piece of agric u 1 t.ural land in Salt Lake County to enable
him to construct a small one-story grocery and fruit store on the
property. (R.20)

That Application was denied on grounds that (1)

the request was in conflict with the County Master Plan, (2) the
proposed use was not necessary nor desirable at that location, and
(3) the ingress and egress to the site was already dangerous. (R.26)
The denial of the Application was appealed to the Board
of County Connnissioners. (R.27)

That body approved the Application

and granted the zoning change, thereby reversing the previous decision
of the Salt Lake Planning Commission. (R.29)
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Plaintiff was granted a Building Permit and made
arrangements to construct the store building on the newly-zoned
premises.

One day before the construction was to begin, plaintiff

was advised by the defendants that his Building Permit had been
revoked and that the approval of the zoning change had been withdrawn by the Commission..

The reason given for the withdrawal was

that the Planning Commission had learned that the legal description
in the plaintiff's Zoning Application was not accurate. (R.22)
The Complaint alleges further that the acts of the
defendants in withdrawing the zoning change previously approved by
the Board of County Commissioners exceeded the jurisdiction of the
Planning Commission and abused its discretion.

Plaintiff alleged

that these actions were arbitrary and capricious in nature. (R.22)
Based thereon, plaintiff sought mandamus relief from the court. (R.24).
The Complaint alleges further that the Planning Commission
was aware of the actual location of the property that was subject
to the zoning change, and that the defendants willfully and intentionally withheld the information about the erroneous property
description from the plaintiff and from the Board of County Commissioners until it would be impossible, because of notice requirements,
to have the appeal re-heard by the Board of County Commissioners as
then constituted.

Both o.f the Salt Lake County Commissioners who

voted in favor of the zoning change were leaving office on January 1,
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- 4 1981, and were being replaced by newly elected officials who were
not previously involved in granting the zoning change.

The only

incumbent County Commissioner had voted against that change.

Plain-

tiff alleged tha-t the defendants were attempting to circumvent the
previous decision of the Board of County Commissioners in that
manner, all of which was contrary to law·and in derogation of the
constitutional and legal rights of the plaintiff .. (R. 22)
Based on the Verified Complaint of the plaintiff, the
court entered its Order to Show Cause requiring the defendants to
certify to the court a Transcript of the records and proceedings
of the administrative body pertaining to plaintiff's Application
for zoning change. (R.23)

This has never been done, but the Salt

Lake County Attorney's Office filed-an Answer alleging that the
legal description set forth in the Notice of the Zoning Hearing
held before the Board of County Commissioners does not accurately
describe the plaintiff's property, is confusing and misleading,
and does not inform interested parties as to the property which
was considered for rezoning.

The Answer questions, because of

defective notice, the enacting of the zoning ordinance which allowed
the zoning change by the Board of County Connnissioners.

The Answer

expressly admits that plaintiff is the owner of certain real
property located at approximately 7770 South 2000 East in Salt Lake
County. (R.34-37)
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Defendants subsequently filed their Motion for Summary
Judgment on the·ground that there were no material facts in dispute
in this action and that defendants were entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. (R.68)

The Motion was supported by affidavits of

some of the defendants, which established that the legal descriptions furnished by the plaintiff were erroneous, a fact which is
not disputed in this action. (R.56-67)

The affidavit of Roy S.

Baty, Jr., states that the street address of 7770 South 2000 East
has been given to another person known as Edson Packer. (R.62)
The plaintiff countered with his own Affidavit in
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. (R.83-91)

This

Affidavit states that the property to be rezoned is located at
approximately 7770 South 2000 East.

Mr. Merrihew pointed out that

he resides at 7750 South 2000 East and his father resides at 7790
South 2000 East.

The vacant property to be rezoned lies between

the residences of the plaintiff and his father, and is located at
approximately 7770 South 2000 East. (R.83-84)

Again, the Answer

admits that plaintiff is the owner of that property. (R.34)
The plaintiff also points out in his Affidavit that
Mr. Edson Packer actually resides on a private roadway at least
1/2 mile west of 2000 East.

Mr. Merrihew also points out that

Mr. Packer has no interest in the property to be rezoned and has no
interest in any land located at approximately 7770 South 2000 East.
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The address used in the Application was chosen for the purpose
of accurately showing the true location of the property rather
than to give the property a street address. (R.85)
Mro Merrihew also points out that he has requested a
similar zoning change on the same piece of property on at least two
previous occasions.

The members of the Salt Lake County Planning

and Zoning Commission visited the premises prior to the hearing on
each of those previous applications.

Both the Planning Commission

and the Salt Lake County Board of commissioners visited the property
in connection with the present Application for zoning change. (R.85)
Mr. Merrihew also points out that none of the defendants
ever raised any question about the location of the property until
the 'discovery' of the erroneous property description, and that
submission of the erroneous property description did not mislead
or misdirect the Salt Lake County Commission or the Salt Lake County
Board of Commissioners in their consideration for the zoning

change.~,

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was argued before
the Honorable G. Hal Taylor on September 16, 1981. (R.92)

After

hearing argument of counsel, the Judge granted the Motion for Summary
Judgment and remanded the matter to the County Commission. (R.92)
Formal judgment was entered by the court on September 23, 1981, dismissing plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice and declaring the
zoning enacted by the Board of County Commissioners to be null and
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void. 'The judgment_ said nothing aho.ut the defense of failure to
exhaust a dministra.tive remedies, and the court apparently di.d not
base its judgment on that defense. (R. 94)
- This appeal was timely filed on October 16,· .1981.

Plain-

tiff contends on this appeal that the 'pleadings and affidavits on
file with the ·court raise mater.ial questions of fact to be ·resolved
by the ·court at trial, and that defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment should have beeri deriied. (R. 9 6)
. ARGUMENT·

POINT. NO. I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY ENTERED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
BECAUSE. THERE.WERE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT
TO BE DECIDED BY A TRI.AL OF THIS ACTION
WHEN THE.CASE WAS CONCLUDED BY THE COURT.
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defines the
circumstances under which the court may enter Summary Judgment in
a pending legal action.

The applicable language reads as follows:

"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depos.itions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law."
In construing and applying this Rule, the Utah Supreme
Court has carefully def±tied :·and limited the circumstances under
which Sunnnary Judgment is appropriate.

In the recent case of

Grow v. Marwick Development, Inc., 621 P.2d 1249, the Utah court
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pointed out that Sunnnary Judgment can only be granted when there is
no dispute as to a material fact.

The language of the court elabor-

ating on this principle is as follows:
"It is a well-settled principle of law that sunnnary judgment
can only be granted when there is no dispute as to a material
fact. Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 29 Utah 2d 184, 506
P.2d 1274 (1973); Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman,
17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P.2d 807 (1966). The purpose of summary
judgment is to save the expense and time of the parties and
the court, and if the party being ruled against could not
prevail when the facts are looked at most favorably for his
position, then summary judgment should be granted. Holbrook
Co .. v. Adams, Utah, 542 P.2d 191 (1975). If there is a
question of fact raised by the pleadings or affidavits, the
court is precluded from granting summary judgment. Hatch v.
Sugarhouse·Finance Co., 20 Utah 2d 156, 434 P.2d 768 (1967)."
In W. M. Barnes Company v. Ohio Natural Resources Company,
627 P.2d 56, the court pointed out that the district court has no
right to weight disputed evidence or determine the credibility of
witnesses in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

In this regard,

the court stated as follows:
"On a motion for summary judgment, it is not appropriate
for a.court to weigh disputed evidence concerning such
factors; the sole inquiry to be determined is whether
there is a material issue of fact to be decided. Holbrook
Co. v. Adams, Utah, 542 P.2d 191 (1975). In making that
determination, a court should not evaluate the credibility
of the witness. It is of no moment that the evidence on
one side may appear to be strong or even compelling, and
documentary evidence is not dispositive if the intent and
purpose underlying the documents are at issue. Kjar v~
Brimley, supra."(27 U.2d 411, 497 P.2d 23)
In the case of Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, which

to

is cited extensively in most later cases dealing with sunnnary judgment, '.o
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the court emphasized the importance of allowing issues of fact to
be decided by the jury.

We quote from the decision as follows:

" . . • it only takes·one sworn statement under oath to
dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact. This is analogous to
the elemental rule that the fact trier may believe one
witness as against many, or many against one.

·* of*the*summary
* judgment proIt is not *the *
purpose
cedure to judge the credibility of the averments of
parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. Neither
is it to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve
disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to eliminate the
time, trouble and expense of trial when upon any view taken
of the facts as asserted by the party ruled against, he
would not be entitled to prevail. Only when it so appears,
is the court justified in refusing such a party the opportunity of presenting his evidence and attempting to persuade
the ·fact trier to his views. Conversely, if there is any
dispute as to any issue, material to the settlement of the
controversy, the summary judgment should not be granted."
The Utah case of Frederick May & Company v. Dunn, 13 U.2d
40, 368 P.2d 266, points out that the court must view the pleadings,
evidence, admissions and inferences therefrom in a light most favorable
to the loser, and that the record must preclude, as a matter of law,
all reasonable possibility that the loser could win if given a trialo
Applying the tests laid down by this court in the above
cases, it appears that the District Judge was in error when he granted
Sunnnary Judgment in favor of the defendants in this action.

The plead-

ings and affidavits on file herein raised questions of fact pertaining
to whether the public and the Commissioners were aware of the accurate
location of the property and whether they were mislead or confused by
the inaccurate legal description.

There were other factual questions

about the arbitrary and capricious nature of the action taken by
defendants· and about whether defendants intentionally violated the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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constitutional and legal rights of the plaintiff.
A.

Location of property.
Although plaintiff has conceded that the legal description

on the Application for zoning change was not accurate in all respects,
he has not thereby suggested or agreed that the Application did not
adequately describe the property for interested persons or that the
Application mislead or confused interested parties as to its actual
location.

The Application states that the property is located at

7770 South 2000 East in Salt Lake County..

(Ro84)

This piece of

property is well known to the Salt Lake County Planning Commission.
Mr. Merrihew has requested a similar zoning change on the same piece
of property on at least two previous occasions.

Those previous

applications were denied, but in each instance the members of the
Salt Lake County Planning Commission visited the premises to make
an on-site inspection of the property prior to the hearing held on
the application.

In connection with the present applicatio.n, the

Salt Lake County Planning Commission and the Salt Lake County Board
of Commissioners both visited the property described in the Application before their separate rulings were made on the zoning change.
Until the 'discovery' of the erroneous property description, none
of the defendants in this action ever raised any question about the
location of the property.

Attached to the Merrihew Affidavit as

Exhibit B, is a map that was prepared by the Salt Lake County Planning ,
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Commission in connection with plaintiff's Application for Zoning
Change.(R.88)

The circled area of that map shows the exact location

of the property which plaintiff asked to have rezoned.

That Exhibit

was prepared by the planning staff, and we can presume that they
knew the location of the property which they so accurately outlined
on their· map.

(R.85-86)

In an effort to show their confusion as to the location of
the property, the defendants filed the Affidavit of Roy S. Baty, Jr.,
who points out that the address on the Application of 7770 South 2000
East was given to property owned by Edson Packer on June 7, 1972.

On the other hand, Mr •. Merrihew states in his Affidvait that he resides in a home at 7750 South 2000 East while his father resides at
7790 South 2000 East.

The property between the two homes is vacant

land that is owned by the plaintiff.
7770 South 2000 East.

Its approximate location is

That address was used in the Application

because it most nearly described the street address of the proposed
store building. (R.85-86)
The conflicting affidavits of Roy S. Baty, Jr. and John E.
Merrihew raise issues of fact regarding whether the Board knew the
precise location of the rezoned property and whether adjoining land
owners were confused or mislead by the erroneous legal description.
Neither the Utah statutes nor the Salt Lake County Zoning
Ordinances specify the form of the notice to be published and given
to the public in connection with appeals made to the Board of County
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Commissioners on zoning matters.

The Revised Ordinances of Salt

Lake County, 1966, §22-1-2, specifies the appeal procedures.

It

provides that any person shall have the right to repeal from any
decision rendered by the Salt Lake County Planning Commission by
filing an appeal in writing within 10 days after the decision with
the Board of County Connnissioners.

The ordinance provides further

that the Board of County Commissioners may set a date for a public
hearing, notice of which will be published in a newspaper of general
circulation within the county at least 30 days prior to the hearing.
In the case of Naylor v •. Salt Lake City Corporation, 17 Utah

l

2d 300 ,. 410 P. 2d 764, the Utah Supreme Court held that the notice
of a zoning ordinance was proper and adequate even though the notice
incorrectly stated the reclassification that was desired. The notice
advised that the proposed change was from R-6 to C-3, while the
zoning was actually changed from R-6 to B-3.

Plaintiffs claimed

that since the notice was erroneous, the zoning change was void.
This court noted that the plaintiffs had suffered no disadvantage
because they had had actual notice of the change made and had participated in the hearings before the Board of County Commissioners.
Utah law in this regard is similar to cases decided in
other states.

In Capps v. City of Raleigh, 241 SE.2d 527, 531, the

North Carolina court held that

sin~e

the zoning ordinance in question

1

did not require a metes and bounds description, then a general notice

1

designating the area to be affected by the zoning change was sufficient to put property owners in the vicinity on notice that their
property may be rezoned.
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In Sweetman v. Town of Cumberland, 364 A.2d 1277, the
court laid down a test for the sufficiency of notice to be given in
zoning cases.

The plaintiff contended that the notice to neighbor-

ing landowners was .insufficient because it did not describe the
land by metes and

bounds~

The court stated that the notice in zon-

ing cases must be sufficient to inform the ordinary layman lacking
experience in zoning matters of the property affected and the changes
sought.

A metes and bounds description is not needed to satisfy

this test.

Significant here was the fact that notice was mailed to

all adjoining landowners having property within 200 feet of the
zoned property.
The courts of Florida held an ordinance valid despite the
fact that the description of the property affected by it was different from the property described in the notice pursuant to which it
was passed.

See Bregar v. Britton,75 So.2d 753, Cert Den 348 US 972,

99 L.Ed 757, 75 S.Ct. 534.
In Closterman v. Cranford Township, 22 NJ Super 204, 91
A.2d 646, the New Jersey court affirmed a judgment upholding the
validity of a zoning ordinance even though the legal description
was inaccurate.

The court noted that the monumenting in the notice

was sufficient, since the street lines of the property constituted
monuments and correctly delineated the property.

The court found

no irregularities in the notice of the ordinance and said the
purpose of the statutory notice is to give citizens notice of the
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consideration of the ordinance and an opportunity to be heard.
Since the facts showed that citizens appeared in substantial numbers at the hearing, then the purposes
served.

o~

the statute had been

See also Helms v. Charlotte, 255 NC 647, 122 SE.2d 814,

96 ALR2d 439.
In Ciaffone v. Community Shopping Corporation, 195 VA. 41,
77 SEo2d 817, 39 ALR2d 757, the Virginia court rejected the contention that a zoning ordinance was invalid because notice of the
exact property to be affected by it had not been published in
accordance with the state enabling statute where the trial judge
had found that the property was described with reasonable certainty
and sufficient definiteness to be identified.

See also 2525 East

Avenue Inc. v-. Brighton, 33 MISC 2d 1029, 228 NYS2d 209, 17 APP
DIV 2d 908, 233 NYS2d 759.
In Carson v. Board of Appeals, 321 Mass. 649, 75 NE2d 116,
the Massachusetts court held that notice of hearing on a petition
for a special permit for the erection and maintenance of a garage
was adequate even though the street adress stated therein was
erroneous.

It appeared that the subject property had once been

part of a large tract which fronted on Bedford Street and that the
entire tract was numbered 47-49 Bedford Street.

Prior to the filing

of the petition for the special permit, the owner had sold off the
portion fronting on Bedford Street, leaving the property to be
rezoned fronting on Camellia Place, which ran easterly from Bedford
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Street.

The court said the notice was sufficient even though the

land did not front on Bedford Street because the remaining land was
still being taxed as if it were located at 47-49 Bedford Street.
The court said the description in the petition and notice could
hardly have ref erred to any land other than that for which the
special permit was requested, since the only other land having the
same numbering was the land whcih had already been conveyed to the
town.

The court also noted that since no one objected to the wrong

description at the hearing before the board, then no one could have
been mislead by the description.
The case of Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 20 U.2d 310, 437
P.2d 442, seems to establish the Utah test for determining the
sufficiency of notice to the public in zoning cases.

In expressing

its feelings about the notice requirements, the Utah court quoted
from Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 US 306, 70 S.Ct. 652,
94 L.Ed. 365, as follows:
11

The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the
opportunity to be heard. * * *
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.
* * * A notice must be of such nature as reasonabl~ to
convey the required information
*and it must a ford
reasonable time to those interested to make their a earance.
Emp asis y t e court.

**

The above cases show that a flawless metes and bounds
description of the property to be rezoned is not necessary so long
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as the recipients of the notice can reasonably ascertain that the
subject property may be affected by the enactment.

In the case now

before the court, the Salt Lake Planning Commission was fully aware
of where the property was located.

Its members had actual notice

of the precise spot where Mr. Merrihew wanted to build the store.
Many property owners in the immediate vicinity had participated in
the hearings held before the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
County.

The erroneous legal description caused them no inconvenience

or loss whatsoever.

Defendants didn't even discover the erroneous

property description until after the hearings had been held and the
decision had been rendered.

The fact that there were some errors

in the legal description did not void the notice given to the public
or nullify the proceedings in which the zoning was changed.
One obvious legal principle appears from reading the many
cases cited above.

There is no way to determine whether the given

notice of a proposed zoning change is adequate or proper without first
hearing the facts and circumstances relating thereto.

The contradic-

tory information found in the pleadings and affidavits in this case
did not give the court sufficient factual basis upon which to rule
on the issues as a matter of law.
B.

Arbitrary and capricious action of the defendantso
A second question of fact remained to be decided by the

trial court before entry of judgment wa3 proper.

Plaintiff's Complaint i
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alleges that defendants willfully and intentionally withheld the
information about the erroneous property description from him and
from the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County until
November 25, 1980, so he could not, because of statutory notice
requirements, have his appeal reheard by the Board of County Commissioners as then constituted.

The two County Commissioners who

voted in favor of the zoning change were scheduled to leave office
on January 1, 1981.

Through the election process, they had been

replaced by newly elected officials who were not previously involved
in granting the zoning changeo ·The sole remaining incumbent County
Commissioner had voted against the change.

Plaintiff alleged that

the acts of the defendants in attempting to circumvent the previous
decision of the Board of County Commissioners were arbitrary and
capricious and were in derogation of the constitutional and legal
rights of the plaintiff.
The affidavits of the parteis do not address themselves
to this issue.

There is no way to determine whether plaintiff's

allegations of arbitrary and capricious action are true without
hearing facts presented by the parties at the trial of this case.
In the case of Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 16 U.2d 192,
392 P.2d 27, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a Summary Judgment
entered in a zoning case.

The plaintiff had alleged an abuse of

discretion and arbitrary action on the part of the Salt Lake Ci'ty

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 18 Commission fn,changing the zoning classification of certain real
property.

This court held that plaintiffs, by their Complaint and

by their offer of proof, presented genuine issues to be resolved by
the court at the trial.

Upon a second appeal of the same case after

trial, Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 17 U.2d 277, 410 P.2d
764, the court held that the evidence at trial supported defendant's
claim that the City Commissioners were not guilty of an abuse of
discretion.

The combination of these two appeals indicates that the

questions of arbitrary and capricious actions are to be determined
from the facts of the case presented at trial.
POINT NO. II
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT REQUIRED TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE FILING
THIS ACTION IN THE DISTRICT COURT.
Based upon the c.ase of Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Company,
392

P~2d

40, 15 U.2d 305, the defendants claimed in their Motion for

Summary Judgment that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in the District Court.
case was factually different from the instant case.

The cited

In the Lund

case, the court held that plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies because he had failed to appeal a decision of the
Planning Commission to the Board of County Commissioners, as required
by the applicable ordinance.

The court held that an adverse decision

of the Planning Commission must first be appealed to the higher administrative tribunal before a suit can be filed to contest that decision.
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The facts of the Lund case are much different than the
ones now facing the court.

Plaintiff in this action first went

before the Salt Lake County Planning Commission with his Application
for a zoning change.

When that change was denied, the decision of

the Planning Commission was appealed to the Board of Commissioners
of Salt Lake County and was reversed.
that decision.

No appeal was taken from

After the decision was final, the employees of the

Planning Commission set it aside without hearing or review because
of alleged notice deficiencies.

Having taken such administrative

action, the defendants now claim that plaintiff must return to the
Board of County Commissioners and appeal the decision of the
bureaucrat before plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies.
The law of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
even apply to this case.

The very purpose of Rule 65B, Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure, is to provide relief from arbitrary and capricious
administration actions such as the one referred to herein.

The rule

provides for. a cause of action separate and apart from any available
administrative remedies.
Since it does not appear from the record that the court
based its Summary Judgment on defendants' claim that plaintiff has
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the plaintiff will
not elaborate further on this point unless requested to do so by
the court.
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CONCLUSION
For reasons stated herein, the court should reverse the
decision of the District Judge and remand the matter to the District·
Court for trial.
DATED

this~ay

of January, 1982.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

w~~~

1LRALPH

t«4EMM

Attorney ror Appellant
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